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Case No. 20070967-CA
IN THE

UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Corey Edward Harvell,
Defendant/Appellant

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution in a conviction for attempted
theft by receiving stolen property. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution where
pecuniary damages were causally related to defendant's driving a stolen car and
were sufficiently foreseeable to be recoverable in a civil action for conversion?
Standard of Review. "Trial courts are vested with wide latitude and discretion
in sentencing,... and we will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it
exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Corbitt,
2003 UT App 417, f 6,82 P.3d 211 (citations omitted). "'[T]he exercise of discretion

in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court/" Id. (quoting State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978) (brackets in original).
STATUTES1
The following statutes at attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2008);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2008);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102, -302 (West Supp. 2008).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, theft by receiving stolen property, and
theft. Rl-2. Defendant pled guilty to attempted burglary, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp.
2008), third degree felonies. R23-38. The court dismissed the theft charge. R37-38.
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent zero-to-five-year prison terms on the two

1

Citation is to current statutes. No alteration in statutes amended
subsequent to the events at issue, however, affects disposition of the case.
2

offenses, to be served consecutively with terms imposed in two other cases.2 R6969A.
At a hearing, defendant argued that he should not be ordered to pay
restitution for brake repairs to the stolen car or for damage to an iPod left in the car
because he was not legally responsible for those items—the repairs, he argued, were
made long after the car was recovered and then driven, and he had not pled guilty
to theft of the car, but only to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R87:3-6,
13-14. The court disagreed and ordered defendant to pay restitution of $763.24 to
Cami Losee, whose stolen car defendant pled to receiving. R71. The $763.24
represents restitution for brake repair—$539.24, a tank of gas—$25.00, and
replacement of a Nano iPod--$199.00. R71; 87:16.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the restitution order. R75.

2

This case was No. 071901648. R69. In case No. 061907673, defendant pled
guilty to theft by deception, a third degree felony. R92:3. In case No. 071900347,
defendant pled guilty to unlawful acquisition, possession or transfer of a financial
transaction card and falsely making, coding, signing a financial transaction card,
third degree felonies. Id. at 3. In yet another case, No. 071902287, defendant pled
guilty to attempted theft, a third degree felony. Id. at 3.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS3
On February 7,2007, Cami Losee, left her Hyimdai Elantra at the residence of
her friend, Hector Carillo, before she departed for a vacation in Italy. R45 (Letterrl),
48 (Receipt:!.); 87:9;. Ms. Losee locked the doors of her car and gave the keys to Mr.
Carillo, which he hung on rack in his residence. R45 (Letter:l). Her car "was
running fine before [she] left" R46 (Letter:2). Sometime after midnight on February
12, while Ms. Losee was away from Salt Lake City, Mr. Carillo's home was broken
into, many of his valuables were taken, and Ms. Losee's car was stolen. R45
(Letter:l); 87:9.
On February 13, 2007, Gary Rigby returned to his home to find a silver
Hyundai parked in front of his Salt Lake City home. R2. Mr. Rigby saw defendant
"around his residence" and then "just walk[] inside." Id.; PSI:5. Mr. Rigby went
inside his home and found it "ransacked": his clothes and belongings "were thrown
all over," several drawers and cabinets looked as though they had been "gone
through," and a new 27-inch flat screen TV and a carton of Winston 100 cigarettes

The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R2-3); the
presentence investigation report (PSI) (R66); Ms. Losee's letter of June 10, 2007
(Letter) (R45-46), an automotive repair receipt (Receipt) (R48), and an I-pod cost
statement (Statement) (R49); see also Victim Information File ; and the evidence
presented at the restitution hearing. R87. The letter, receipt, and statement are
attached at Addendum B.
4

were missing. R2;PSI:5-6;R87:15-16. He immediately called 911. PSL6. Mr. Rigby
then exited his home, where he accosted defendant. PSL5. Defendant claimed that
he was a friend of Mr. Rigby's son. Id. Defendant then fled, but not before Mr.
Rigby got the license number and a description of the Hyundai and defendant. Id.;
R2. A short time later, an individual walking his dog near an apartment complex
found a box of checks belonging to Mr. Rigby and called him. PSL6
The police responded to the apartment complex, recovered the checks, and
located the Hyundai, by now reported stolen. Id. At the apartment corresponding
to the parking stall where the car was found, police spoke with the tenant, Robinetta
Hill. Id. She initially denied any knowledge of the car. Id. The police returned to
the car and found a Salt Lake County Sheriffs ankle monitor page and an
identification card with defendant's name. Id. Returning to the apartment, the
police further questioned Ms. Hill. Id. She denied that defendant was in the
apartment, but permitted the police to look around. Id. In the bathroom, in plain
view, they found torn checks belonging to Mr. Rigby in the toilet. Id. They found
defendant in the bedroom and arrested and questioned him. Id.
Defendant told the police he never entered the residence. Id. He initially
denied driving the stolen car, but eventually claimed it was loaned to him. Id. On
the bed, in plain view, the police saw a carton of Winston 100 cigarettes. Id.
5

Ms. Losee, stranded in New York by inclement weather for a week, called Mr.
Carillo to pick up her car. R45 (Letter:l) Upon recovering her car when she arrived
in Salt Lake City, Ms. Losee "immediately noticed the alignment was off, [her] iPod
was broken... and the gas tank, [which she had filled before leaving] was empty/'
Id. Because her gas tank was empty, she concluded that her car had been driven "at
least 300 miles." R46 (Letter:2). About a week later, she noticed a "screeching"
noise from the right front side of the car whenever she applied the brakes. R46
(Letter:2). She was only able to afford to repair the car in April 2007, by which time
the brake problem rendered the car "almost impossible to drive." Id. Her
automobile mechanic informed her that repair of the right front brakes—replacement
of brakes, caliper, and rotor—would necessarily require replacement of the left front
brakes, too. Id. The alignment was corrected at the same time. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court implicitly found that there existed a causal relationship
between defendant's possession and admitted driving of a stolen vehicle and the
damages suffered by the owner of the car. Defendant admittedly drove the stolen
car, if he did not steal it himself. He was found in possession of the car one day
after the car was stolen. There was undisputed evidence that he recklessly drove the
car, which had no operating problems before the car was stolen. The victim
6

discovered the first operational damage—"the alignment was off"—and the damage
to her iPod immediately upon recovering the car. She discovered the second
operational damage—"screeching" brakes—only a week later. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution to the victim of
defendant's theft by receiving stolen property for damages to her alignment, brakes,
and broken iPod, and for gas.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
RESTITUTION WHERE PECUNIARY DAMAGES WERE CAUSALLY RELATED
TO DEFENDANT'S DRIVING A STOLEN CAR AND WERE SUFFICIENTLY
FORESEEABLE TO BE RECOVERABLE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR
CONVERSION
Defendant claims the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for
the repairs to Ms. Losee's car and for the broken iPod. Aplt. Br. at 6-16. He argues
that those damages were not the result of the criminal conduct to which he pled
guilty. Aplt. Br. at 10. Nor, he continues, was "[any] evidence . . . presented to
establish a sufficient nexus between [his] admitted conduct of possessing the vehicle
and the damage found/' which was caused by Ms. Losee's continued operation of
the car. Aplt. Br. at 6,13-15. Defendant misapprehends the scope of the law and his
admissions, the range of his liability in committing the intentional tort of

7

conversion, and the discretion of the court to fashion an equitable award to the
victim.
Defendant pled guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R24,
37.
"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (West Supp.
2008). "[A] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he . . . engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime [] and
intends to commit the crime

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (a)(b)(i) (West

2004).
In his plea affidavit, defendant acknowledged, as the factual basis of the plea,
that he "drove a stolen vehicle/7 R25. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that
he "retained . . . a motor vehicle . . . knowing that the vehicle had been stolen."
R96:8.
At a restitution hearing at which defendant was present, the defense brought
the victim's, Ms. Losee's, letter to the trial court's attention, and the court received
8

Ms. Losee's statement of damages. R43-49, 70; 87:4-5, 9. No other evidence was
received. R87:l-17. Defendant "[did not] take issue with [Ms. Losee's] request[] for
a tank of gas,"—"[h]e certainly drove it, and it had gas in it at some p o i n t . . . . "
R87:5. Nor did he ever challenge charges for the alignment ($ 69.95), which Ms.
Losee "immediately noticed" "[w]hen she finally reached Salt Lake/' R45 (Letter:l),
48 (Receipt); 87:1-17. Defendant argued only that he should not be held accountable
for the brake repairs and the broken iPod because he was not charged with stealing
the car and damages to the brakes were normal wear and tear. R87:3-6,12-13. The
trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $ 763.24—$ 539.24
for "repairs to [Ms. Losee's] vehicle," $ 25.00 for a "tank of gas," and $ 199.00 for
her broken iPod. R87:16; Order for Restitution, R71 (Addendum C).
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
chapter . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2008).
"'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is convicted
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(l) (West Supp. 2008).
9

Defendant correctly states that "a defendant cannot be ordered to pay
restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution/, State v. Hight,
2008 UT App 118,13,182 P.3d 922 (citation omitted) "Furthermore, the restitution
statute 'requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established,
much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution/" Id. (quoting State v.
Watson, 1999 UT App 273, f 5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam)). Relying on these
propositions, defendant argues that restitution was improperly ordered because his
conviction or admitted criminal conduct failed to demonstrate a "sufficient nexus"
or "causal relationship" to the automobile damages or the broken iPod. Aplt Br. at
9-12.
In support of his argument, defendant discusses three cases which, unlike this
case, exemplify the absence of a sufficient nexus between criminal activity and the
victim's damages. Aplt. Br. at 9-12. In State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,40 P.3d 1143,
Mast was found with some of the articles taken in a burglary. Id. at H 3-4. She pled
guilty to receiving stolen property, but never admitted possessing any of the other
stolen property not found on her person. Id. at f 5 . This Court reversed the order of
restitution for all the stolen goods, holding that, based on her plea only to receiving
stolen property, Mast "[could] not be held to answer for all the damages resulting
10

from the burglary"— damages for items unconnected with Mast's admitted criminal
activity. Id. at 1 1 8 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Watson, the Court held that
Watson could not be ordered to pay restitution relating to a murder where she had
pled guilty only to obstruction of justice for selling the car she "allegedly" drove her
codefendants to and from the crime scene. Id. at Ti 1-2. The Court held that the
offense to which Watson pled guilty had no intrinsic relationship to the murder and
could only be related to it through impermissible inferences concerning Watson's
having driven the car or her state of mind. Id. at f l 4-6. See State v. Woods, 953
P.2d 834, 836-37 (Wash. Ct. App.) (restitution improper where guilty plea to
possession of stolen vehicle fixed time of possession and "it cannot be said that 'but
for' Wood's possession of the stolen vehicle in September, the owner would not
have lost the personal property located in the vehicle when it was stolen in
August"), rev. denied, 969 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1998). See also State v. Tetters, 914 P.2d
784,784 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (same). Aplt. Br. at 13.
In contradistinction to the defendants in those cases, defendant here admitted
criminal activity causally related to the victim's damages. He admitted that he
drove the car. R25; 87:5. At least part of the damage was immediately discovered
when Ms. Losee recovered her car. R45 (Letterrl). And unlike the victims in Mast,
Watson, and Woods, Ms. Losee has a viable civil action for all her damages in the
11

circumstances of this case, based on defendant's conversion of her property, as
explained below.
Defendant's "criminal activity" is firmly established by his guilty plea to theft
by receiving stolen property. R23-36. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, \ 5 (recognizing
that the "firmly established" requirement did not apply to any particular missing
items in a burglary case—"it is only the initial crime for which liability must be
legally certain").
By pleading guilty to attempted theft by receiving, defendant became subject
to liability for conversion. "A conversion is an act of willful interference with a
chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is
deprived of its use and possession." Alfred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726,728 (Utah 1958).
See Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, i f 4,9 ("'[T]he record in the case before us"—Corbitt
pleaded guilty to possession of a vehicle he knew was stolen—"reflects that the
State presented evidence which would support a civil conversion action against
[Corbitt]") (quoting State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539,543 (Utah App. 1997)) (brackets in
original). Accordingly, defendant was subject to liability for pecuniary damages.
"'Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market
12

value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed

" Utah Code

Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (WestSupp. 2008).4 "[T]hedamages in an action for conversion
are measured by the sum of the money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for all
actual losses . . . sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's
wrong/' Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, \ 9 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
"[T]he measure of damages is flexible, allowing the trial court to fashion an
4

The general sentencing statute, section 76-3-201, contains provisions that
parallel those of Title 77, Chapter 38a. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp.
2008) (Addendum A). Through oversight, that section continues to define
"pecuniary damages" somewhat differently than section 77-38a-102(6). See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (West Supp. 2008). Section 76-3-201 states that
'"[pecuniary damages' means all special damages, but not general damages
"
That section also omits the qualifying language in subsection 6 that follows the term
"economic injury": "whether or not yet incurred." Section 77-38a-102(6). It also
omits the concluding language of subsection 6 that follows the word "harmed":
"and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or
exemplary damages and pain and suffering." Id. The State does not contend that,
for the purposes of this case, the language of section 76-3-201 (4) (a), as Utah courts
have interpreted it, would lead to different results than section 77-38a-102(6).
Nevertheless, it is the definition set out in section 77-38a-102(6) that represents the
Legislature's intent. First, section 76-3-201 expressly directs that "[i]n determining
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures
as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, the Crime Victims Reparation Act." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(b) (West Supp. 2008). Further, the language of section 77-38a102(6), amended in 2005, reflects this Court's correction and clarification of the type
of damages restitution is intended to reach. See Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f l 18-28
(Greenwood, J., concurring) (observing that defining "pecuniary damages" as "all
special damages but not general damages" reversed "what the Legislature probably
intended," but that Utah courts had appropriately interpreted the statute, focusing
on "demonstrable pecuniary loss"—"actual economic harm").
13

equitable award to the victim/7 Hight, 2008 UT App 118,13 (quoting Corbitt, 2003
UT App 417, \ 9) (brackets in original).
Thus, the only disputed question is whether defendant's criminal activity
actually resulted in pecuniary damages. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West
Supp. 2008) (mandating that a person make restitution for "criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages"). Defendant argues that "[i]n this case, there was
no evidence that showed a "sufficient nexus" between the defendant's conduct
resulting from the short amount of time he admitted to possessing the vehicle and
the brake repairs required on Ms. Losee's vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 13. But in fact and in
law, defendant is liable to Ms. Losee for all her damages based on his conversion of
her car and her iPod.
In Hight, this Court awarded restitution in a burglary case even though Hight
disputed taking other missing items.

Hight 2008 UT App 118, f !

1, 3.

Nevertheless, the Court upheld restitution for the contemporaneously missing items
because the burglary victim's testimony was unopposed at the restitution hearing.
Id. at 16. The Court further noted that "[the defendant presented no witnesses at
the hearing and presented] no record evidence on appeal that the homeowner's
testimony was so lacking that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted
by the trial court." Id. The facts are similar in this case.
14
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87:4-5, 9. The letter also indicated that Ms. Losee had spoken to a witness to
defendant's driving pattern: "I was told my car was finally recovered when
someone reported seeing it being driven recklessly and throwing stolen checks out
of the window."

R45 (Letter:l). No other evidence was received. R87:l-17.

Defendant "[did not] take issue with [Ms. Losee's] request[] for a tank of gas,"—
"[h]e certainly drove it, and it had gas in it at some point

" R87:5. Nor did he

ever challenge charges for the alignment ($ 69.95), which Ms. Losee "immediately
noticed" "[w]hen she finally reached Salt Lake." R45 (Letter:l), 48 (Receipts), 87:117.
Like the facts in Eight, which established a contemporaneous taking of
disputed items at the time of the burglary, the foregoing facts establish a sufficient
nexus between defendant's admitted driving and undisputed evidence as to his
recklessness on the one hand, and the unchallenged damage to the car's alignment,
discovered almost immediately defendant's use, and the brake problem, discovered
one week later, on the other hand. Compare State v. Sellers,709 P.2d 768,770 (Or. Ct.
App. 1986) (evidence existed "from which the court could find that any damage to
the vehicle which occurred during and after defendant's unauthorized use resulted
from his "criminal activities" and is "pecuniary damage") with Woods, 953 P.2d at
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MMIII

upheld ll'iis uuld i>f

restitution, concluding tl Lat tl te damages for defendant's intention •* I *<M1 mmi' m »t
reduced by either the superseding or comparative negligence of the police. Id. at
543-45.
Finally, the cour t s order for pecuniary damages for the broken iPod was
piopci'ly within Mir

IILII UMIIIS

ilisuvlion in itus case. Even assuming that

defendant did m I strnl Ms I •nsec'sriir himself; his possession ofil i i .i". vvnlnii one
day of that theft. R45 (Letter:!). Fie admitted driving line1 rnr .ind tlino exists
iiiidisputed evidence that he drove recklessly. It is entirely foreseeable that one
driving a car in a reckless manner while tossing the burglary victim's checks from
17 .

the car window would handle any other goods belonging to the victims in the same
manner. See State v. Hiett, 115 P.3d 274,277 (Wash 2005) (en banc) ("[W]e cannot say
that it was unforeseeable that a person guilty of taking a motor vehicle would steal
personal property in the vehicle

").

In sum, the trial court properly ordered ordered restitution for all damages to
Ms, Losee's car.5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the restitution order.
Respectfully submitted February / / , 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

5

Defendant also claims that "the sentencing court's order violates due
process because due process requires more than an inference of responsibility.
Aplt. Br. at 15-16. Because the court's order was proper, the State declines to
address this claim.
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§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allow ed—
Civil penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with-or without an admission of committing' the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which, a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and
medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation
and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) ''Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of
an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniar}?
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, tne cuun Mian n,
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims V
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses'if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime,
(b) The court may not order the defendant lv pay ;••• <;ra,.>:i of g^v-. rnim'iiu*. :.ra:i pur
tation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraounn *>r t>n a -jbsoquijni failure *- a; i - rs a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall
be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it

§ 76-3-201
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any
governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section
64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs and
medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred
by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate
qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter the
reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under
Subsection (6Xa).
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws
1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81,
§ 1; Laws 1992, c 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c.
40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, eff.
April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, e. 270, § 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws
2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff.
May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 208, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws
2007, c. 339, § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353, § 9, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 151, § 1, eff.
May 5, 2008.

§ 76-4-101.

Attempt—Elements of offense

(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission
of the crime; and
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that
result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed if the attendant circumstances h a d been as the actor believed
them to be.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-4-101; Laws 2004, c. 154, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.

§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property''—Duties of pawnbrokers
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner,
knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of i t
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection. (1) is presumed in the case of an actor
who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense
charged; or
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to
require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate
next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of
Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee,
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed,
or withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, received, or
obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do'"not apply to scrap metal processors as. defined in
Section 76-10-901.
(8) As used in this section:
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who:
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same: property back again to
the pledge or depositor;
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security
on the property and takes.or receives the personal property into his possession and who
sells the unredeemed pledges; or
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for m-*": ^ ^ ' >i -'^r persi>: d
property.
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or r Lie or ending ^n thi- ^er>irii> »f
the property.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-408; Laws 1979, c. 71, § 1; Laws 1993. - 102, § I; Law* 204, c. 2<>9, § J'i,
eff. Jan 1, 2005.

§ 77-38a-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the
victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendants criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical
expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant
will enter a plea of guilty or no contest
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time,
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition
that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement
by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are
dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing,
insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a
governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an
offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that
the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty
hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3,
eff. May 2,2005.

§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime ias provided in this chapter, or for conduct for *
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and
in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing
or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating
to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) thefinancialresources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to befixedby the court; .
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole,
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c 185,
§ 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005.
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District Attorney
M l EastBrc^tfway * S t e 4 D 0 • Salt Lake City, U7 fl4111
TelephoneflO1.3*3-7900» Fax BO f "366-7 B91 w»WidslrittatoDfn^0^CO.Dig

May 25,2007
Efcrifar ATTORNEY

CantiLosee
222N300B
3LedciiQiid,UT $46*52
JusHcc Dfciston
MenhVoliDer
Owfeton/^Rhferatr
AssL OAjjsbi /*dnrnbtr3Cor
/)sst£w^jbn y^brnfrrtsinHiaf

j\c:

StataoFUtahv.C50REVEDWAKDHARVELL
District Ct No. Q7190164«
DA Case No. 7003136
Charge /Date Occurred; Theft, February 13,2007

Dear Sir of Madam:
.. This letter is to advise you that you may be eligible 1Dreceiverestitution in
Ihev.abovweisrenoed case. If you feci lefltrtiition ia owed to you, you must
provide ow- office with pepper documentation. Please scod any records you have
with, a'brief OOYEC letter that states the total amount you ace requesting to
substantiate your restitution claim to the address below (Le. copies of receipts,
"bids or olber written documentation. a£ your out-of-pocket expenses). Be advised
that vie may also lecover restitution on behalf of your insurance company if
applicable.
The Court has only allowed a certain amount of timetoprovide restitution,
so please resooitfl mumdi&tetv. I must reoedyc TOUT claim and verifying
documeuti on or before June 1L 2007 for anbmftUl to the Couit. If I do not
'lecexve the necessary infanua£ioa before that time, I wflL assume that you do not
-wish to make arestitutionclaim and -will so inform the Court.
FLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY WHETHER YOU WISH
TO MAKE A CLAIM OR NOT. If you have any questions, on foi injunctions
regarding what documentatioQ the court needs before awarding restitution please
contact me at (801) 166-7803 or fax dcrtaOed Mentation,to(801) 531-4176.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matte*.
Sincerely,
cJ^Sus-cau ^ e ^ u ^
Felicia Beech
Legal Secretary

SALT LAKE

COIT N T T

Juoe-LDr20O7-

To Whom R ^ y Concern:
T am writing in regardstothe «fnu> that was coinimtejediigjuiastiiiBmPebniary
20(37- AB you may know, my car was stolen fir Dm myftiendHectorBogar terrillo's
home-while I was vacan" omng iaftaly. I l&fi.my car parked at his bouse 901 wonld sot
have to payibr parking at me airport. wbilB I was away. I distinctly remember Jockmg.
my car doocra and giving the keys to Bogar, which be then hung OIL arackin his JriGchea,
From what I have heard, Bogar's house was broken into, tny keys-were taken, andraycar
was usedfopacknp all to valuahlBfto^wcTestialaifoBniBoBar's home alosngwiuia,
tewDtherhDmratlialwcr&biurglaiized. 1 was told my cat wasfinallyleoorasd whan,
someooejepaited seeing it being driven reaklesBly and throwing stolen checkB out the
window
Because this incident happened just hows before the TtoQey Square shooting
Bogar was unable tofinishfilingajeport Officers were at his house when they got & call
about the abootmg and understandably bad 60 leaverightaway. Also, because Bogar was
oof tbe owner of fee car he wastoldhe could art report it as staten and that I had to
physically see Chat the cat was missing andffletoereport myBelf. He explained that I
wasc^rftheooimjtrysorm
I received
the news that my oar had been stolen just hours before myflightfromItalytoNew Yaik
and so I wasimable to make-any pbionec^
WbaiLlieachedNew Yoxkl.
affidttfly filed the report myaelf by jbonewitii a deputy and then I also filed a report
withmyinflii£»ttoe cempany.
I was only supposed to spend one nigfrtiti New York and tea fly bade to Bait
Lake but due to aJmj^ snowstorm Jet Blue liad to shutdown, Although. I was not flying
with Jet Blue the shut down did affect me because I was flying standby and all tbe Jet
Bine ticket holders were baying all available tickets. As a result I was stranded in New.
Ya± forces week. TliankfulJy, rhadaplacetasbiy, biJtpayingl«rrDeaisa(ad
transpccTtatioQ to andffeam the airpartforone week was quite expensive, notto mennan I
bad just spent aU inysavings in Italy. On top of that Iliad just used all my vacation time
from wenk in Italy so I had no vacation time leftfortie diy&I was in New Yoric
Iieoeived a call that my car had beenfoundwhile I was sriU in New Yaik so J
called Bogar and another friend Zacfa Jensentopick up my car foe me so 2 was not able to
inspect the car myself to see if there was any damage or if any of my belongings were
missing. I kept the report open, with my insaranoe company untfl. I was able to physically
inspect if myself
When Ifinallyreached SaltLake I immediately noticed the aligns
IPOD was broken and my 1POD FMtranamitter w » missing, jnyed collection was
noticeably smaller, my coat was gone* and the gas tank was empty ([had rilled it just
before I let) tor Italy because I was afraid I would spend all nay money and wouldn't have
enougb moneyforgas). I called my insurance company to mfaroo them of the ooadition
of my car and what items were missing or broken and they informed me that I had a.

^ ^ *

31000 deductible and the cost of all these iteoia was not over $ 1D00 s o l would W
responsible Jar replacingtfiem.I defied my claim wife them at that time.
About a weeiLEtferlnotijce^ajBcroec^
every time I pushed on my brakes. BecmiseIl)adjiutiBtiimc<L4nm
stranded in New Yoak fat i week (unpaid) and I was a student at (hat time I was enable toaifbid any Topaiis. FY1; my ticket to Italy was ptiacticaillyfteebecause I went with a
Mend of mine-who vradts for the aiztincs and while in Baly-we stayed with unload of
oursfromhigb school, otherwise I newer would been able ba aflbrd a trip to Italy.
In April I wasfinallyable to ailbrd repairs facmy car andby that-time theproblem with, my takes'made it ahnotf. impossible to drive. The mechanic informed "me
that they had to replace (he "brakes, caliper, and totoron my front passenger side andra
top erf that they had to repair the driver' a side air "well became they couldVt cepair one
aide without repairing the other. They also -fixedmy alignment at mat time. Ifeelthat
theae repairs were needed because it was dnvea recklesBly while it was stolen. It was
ruoDDirigfmDbcrbrellefl Alsc^TwauseBtleartafuIl tank of gaswasusedllaiawitwaa.
dxivejLatleaat300mLles orrnaie.
I amreqneariDg restitutionforall repairs ifafirt weie done on my oar and all items
bSatweieeirtbcriidaffltig or broken. As yon cam ted by this letter this cranehaAquita an.
impact oo my life nnanciaOy, emotionally, and physically. Also, I am requesting thai the
defendant be piraisbedtotte
Iamalaw-abtdMf^citLeeaandlmid
it unfair that I ihouldhave to pay foe someone site's mistakes. Hopefully "by "hexng
pumshed he'll learn mini MB miBtakes and not become a repeat offender. I would hale
for another person to have to gp thraujjla the oidealthatliehaBjnitmcmroaghr haw attached a.liat of items I am Teanestingrestitutionfor included a receipt for
repaira done on my car and approximate values fbr most of the item* that were missing or
broken. Thank yon fbiytrur aBastatKsem this matter.

ICZD*

a
CO

-T=f

Sincerely,

CamieLoaee

*-c

s

REsrrrrtrnoN BEQUEST
Vehicle
Ropaics
FnUtankjofps

$539.24
$25.00

IPOD and AcceaBorte*
IPOD NAN04GB (broken)
IPOD H1UP EM transmitter

$199.00
$49.95

CD>9
Dresden Dolle-Yes Virginia
TlieKiiifo-DBepCutH
PiBcliofspcK«a*r-#L
Portia hcad-Omnmy
Bveryuttug But the Gitl-Amplrfioi Heart
Tegan and Sam-So Jealous
Bloc Party-Silent Alarm.
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Addendum C

Addendum C

FILED DISTRICT COURT

LOHRAH. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Cristina P. Ortega, #9567
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

Third Judicial District

NOV Of

ORIGINAL

SALT LAKE COUNT?

By.

"Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
Case No.071901648
-vsCOREY EDWARD HARVELL
Defendant.

Judge Judith S. Atherton

Based on the State's Motion, and good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, COREY EDWARD
HARVELL, is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $763.24 to Cami Losee for car
repairs, to include brake repair, gasoline, and a broken IPOD NANO. In addition, the
defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,450.00 to Gary Rigby for
property that was not recovered, including jewelry, a flat screen television set, and video
games. The total amount of restitution for both victims in the above entitled case is

S321324

' 'DATED this

Ouo .
I

day of OCTOBER, 2007.
BY THE COURT
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